Proofs in an arithmetic system are ranked according to a rami cation hierarchy based on occurrences of induction. It is shown that this ranking of proofs corresponds exactly to a natural ranking of the primitive recursive functions based on occurrences of recursion. A function is provably convergent using a rank r proof, if and only if it is a rank r function. The result is of interest to complexity theorists, since rank one corresponds to polynomial time. Remarkably, this characterization of polynomial-time provability admits induction over formulas having arbitrary quanti er complexity.
Introduction
The primitive recursive functions can be assigned ranks, based on an examination of the structure of their derivations as built up from the initial functions by the rules of composition and recursion. One of the hierarchies de ned using such a ranking consists of the polynomial-time computable functions at level 1, and at higher levels consists of certain of the Grzegorczyk classes 4]. The current work shows how to rank arithmetic proofs containing inductions, such that the ranking of proofs corresponds exactly to this ranking of recursions. It is shown that a function can be proven convergent by a rank r proof if and only if it is a rank r function.
The ranking of proofs is entirely syntactic, without any obvious reference to computation time, the size of quanti ed values, etc. The ranking of proofs is not a disguise for the ranking of function symbols appearing in the proofs. Remarkably, induction formulas are allowed to have arbitrary alternations of unbounded quanti ers. Yet the rst level of the logical hierarchy proves convergence of exactly the polynomial time computable functions. Thus, the fragment of arithmetic consisting of rank 1 proofs, passes a key test for being considered a \feasible" system.
Compared to the bounded induction rules of earlier weak subsystems of arithmetic, the present de nitions permit a radical reduction in the syntactic restrictions placed on the induction formula. The only remaining restriction is a relatively mild one concerning occurrences of 0. In exchange, the overall amount of induction in the proof is restricted, by measuring the rank of the proof.
The fragment of arithmetic consisting of rank 1 proofs is not closed under modus ponens. On the one hand, this certainly seems awkward from the viewpoint of traditional approaches to logic and earlier approaches to feasible arithmetic. On the other hand, it is also precisely the kind of feature described by Fagin et. al. as desirable for reasoning about knowledge using limited computational resources 8] p. 309. The present work refers to modal concepts by reading \x = y" as \x is (feasibly, constructively) known to be equal to y". The logical connectives and quanti ers are treated classically. Proofs are trees of formulas with axioms at the leaves and instances of either modus ponens or induction at the interior nodes.
Modal concepts are incident on the idea of rami cation that is central to this work. Generally, a rami ed mathematical system is one in which objects are de ned using levels such that the de nition of an object in level i refers only to objects in levels strictly below i. Such de nitions are \predicative" because they do not contain any circularity of reference. A prototypical example occurs in rami ed set theory, where the universe of sets at level i is de ned by comprehension over sets in the previous universes. In the present work, aǹ object' is an integer together with an depth of understanding (or: amount of knowledge, strength of comprehension) of that integer. Rami cation level r (0 r !) consists of the integers as known with a depth of understanding at least r. Each input position i of each primitive recursive function f is labeled with a`rank' number (f; i) that, intuitively, tells how much understanding of the ith input is required in order to have any understanding at all of the output 4]. One de nes (f) = max i (f; i). Each variable x in each proof is { 3 { The de nition of ( ; x ) proceeds using an analysis of proofs, including an analysis of modus ponens and , that is entirely type level one. This contrasts with all the proof analysis methods that are based on the Curry-Howard isomorphism of formulas as types, using highertype functionals. The present analysis works by de ning a directed weighted graph, the \contribution graph" G( ) of the proof, which contains information about occurrences of in the proof. The vertices of the graph are (code numbers for) the variables of the language, plus certain extra vertices, and the graph consists of a set of directed edges weighted 0 or 1. The rank of a variable is the maximum weight of paths ending at that variable in the graph. Consider a modus ponens instance \ , j ". The derivation of provides a mapping from the ranks of variables in the derivation of , to the ranks of variables in the proof concluded by . The mapping from the rank of one variable to the rank of another is speci ed by the maximum weight path from one to the other in the graph. The composition corresponding to a modus ponens rule is achieved simply by taking the union of the two graphs corresponding to the subproofs. Repeated applications of modus ponens leads to the repeated composition of mappings, not to higher-type abstraction and application. Although the speci c de nition of G( ) is based on the speci c proof system used here, similar constructs should be de nable for other proof systems. As Prawitz noted, \modus ponens is present also in normal derivations in the systems of natural deduction. . . it is really also present in cut-free derivations in the calculus of sequents. . . " ( 18] , p. 261).
The edges in G( ) are de ned in such a way that a rank r < ! proof must contain at least r \nested" inductions. On the other hand, not every induction has signi cantly more computational content than was already in the subproofs. In a computationally signi cant use of induction, the subproofs leading up to the induction premisses add to earlier subproofs in a signi cant way. For example, an induction might have signi cant new computational content if its premisses are obtained by applying the conclusion of an earlier induction to a de ning axiom for a function. This idea will be incorporated into the de nition of G( ), via the choice of edges and weights. Proof rank, de ned using the weights of paths in G( ), is a measure of those occurrences of induction that are interleaved with uses of primitive arithmetic facts. Function rank, in comparison, is a measure of the occurrences of recursion in the function derivation. The two correspond: a function has rank r, if and only if it can be proved convergent by a rank r proof. It is important to realize that proof rank is not a disguise for the rank of function symbols appearing in the proof. For example, a low-rank proof can use the de ning axioms for a high-rank function.
Intuitively speaking, a low-rank proof cannot fully analyze a high-rank function, simply because there are not enough steps in the unrolled version of the proof to cover all of the steps in the unrolled computation of the function (by \unrolled" I mean, very loosely, the replacement of induction or recursion by a sequence of steps). For example, to prove the convergence of a function that is de ned by a nontrivial recursion, it seems that one has to use at least one instance of induction. A proof by modus ponens alone won't be able to analyze the recursive function. This seems to be true even if one allows quanti er reasoning in the proof by modus ponens. We would like to generalize this idea to functions de ned by various ranks of recursion and proofs having corresponding ranks of induction. As it has been shown { 4 { that these ranks of recursion characterize various function classes with limited computational complexity 4], one expects the corresponding ranks of induction to characterize various proof systems having limited computational complexity. Remarkably, the result holds even when quanti ers are unrestricted in the induction formulas.
Why is it that the presence of quanti ers in an induction formula does not help a lowrank proof to analyze a high-rank function? I can think of two possible intuitions to hazard in response to this question. First, one can speculate that quanti ers in a thoroughly constructive and feasible system should be eliminable in favor of free variables and feasibly constructive type 1 Skolem functions. Stated di erently, the natural state of a airs in a feasible system is to use feasible Skolem functions, not existential quanti ers. Alternating quanti ers are introduced when one throws away the de nitions of the Skolem functions. From this perspective, the use of alternating quanti ers in an induction formula should not represent a computationally powerful new principle. On the contrary, the use of existential quanti ers actually represents a loss of information, since the de nitions of the witnessing Skolem functions are no longer known.
A second conceivable response is to note that quanti ers in a classical arithmetic proof arise either from rst-order rules or from induction rules. The classical rst-order quanti er manipulations permit one to keep track of the scope of free variables, e.g. when they are in negative subformulas. The quanti ers introduced by these rules do not seem to me to have a lot of computational content: they mark the scope of variables, not the presence of a computation. On the other hand, a quanti er that is introduced in the conclusion of induction, is a notation indicating that the induction is complete. Such a quanti er marks a rami cation step, and hence is a mark of computational content. But the computational content marked by such a quanti er is just whatever was obtained during the induction. Thus, the quanti er symbol itself is peripheral to the main issue, which is the occurrence of induction. Perhaps limiting the presence of such quanti ers in induction formulas just serves indirectly to restrict the layering of induction, by limiting induction formulas that carry the mark of a preceeding induction. I propose instead to directly restrict the layering of inductions.
A review of earlier work in weak subsystems of arithmetic is given by Krajicek 10] . For relevant background in recursion theory and computational complexity, see Clote's survey 7].
Ranking Recursions
The development begins by de ning a recursive function class which is equivalent to the class of primitive recursive functions. A function derivation is a tree structure with leaves labeled by initial functions and internal nodes appropriately labeled by functions de ned using one of the derivation rules. I frequently speak of a derivation interchangeably with the corresponding function, although of course each derivable function has many derivations.
Write m f for the arity of function f. The class PR 2 is the class of derivations de ned by:
Initial functions: constant 0; successors s 0 x = 2x and s 1 x = 2x + 1; predecessor p(x) = bx=2c; and conditional c(x; y; z) = \if x mod 2 = 0 then y else z".
Full composition: given h and g 1 ; : : :; g m with m = m h 1, de ne f by f(x) = h(g 1 (x 1 ); : : : ; g m (x m )), where eachx j is a vector consisting of elements from the vector x (possibly with repetitions, omissions, or changes in order). Full recursion on notation: given g and h de ne f by f(0;ỹ) = g(ỹ) and f(x;ỹ) = h(x;ỹ; f(px;ỹ)) for x 6 = 0.
In the recursion scheme: position 1 in f is the recursion position; position m h in h is the critical position; the step function is h.
To rank all of these functions, one assigns a rank, (f; i), for each derivation f 2 PR 2 and each position 1 i m f . The rank is supposed to be a measure of how hard it is to understand the function's use of a given input. One can think of rank as being in some sense a measure of how \opaque" an input position is. In the logical setting, substitutivity of equals will fail, with the ranks of input positions being related to the amount of induction that is required to know the output of the function.
In de ning (f), one uses the idea that when a function f is derived from subfunctions h, then there is some sense in which the rank of input positions ofh contribute to the rank of input positions of f. For example, if f(x) = h(0; g(x)), then one requires (f; 1) (h; 2) and (f; 1) (g; 1). The key point is that recursion makes it strictly more di cult to understand how a value is used. If f(x) = h(x; f(px)), then one requires (f; 1) 1+ (h; 2) as well as (f; 1) (h; 1). The de nition of (f; i) is Rank di ers from \tiers" ( Leivant 14] ) because rank is not a type system. This is not merely a syntactic distinction, as the present system admits more instances of composition and recursion than the stricter system in 14]. In particular, PR 2 includes all the primitive recursive functions and separates at all levels, while the system in 14] collapses to level 2. Now a proof system is developed that is suitable for counting the rank of inductions. I would like to be able to admit a function symbol for every primitive recursive function, without having convergence of all functions proved trivially by existential generalization from re exivity instances f(x) = f(x). To accomplish this, I view`=' and`6 =' as relations that exclude each other but which do not satisfy x = y _ x 6 = y. These relations can be read constructively: \x = y" is \x is known to be the same as y" or \there is a constructive demonstration that x is the same as y", and \x 6 = y" is similarly read as \x is known to be di erent from y" or \there is a constructive demonstration that x is di erent from y". Other than`=' and`6 =', the logic is entirely classical; and classical semantics are used. This approach is in some sense opposite to intuitionistic logic, in which` ' and other connectives are given a constructive semantics, and in which re exivity and substitutivity of`=' are treated as analytic truths. Compared to free logic, the current approach has the advantage of classical quanti er rules together with correspondingly simpler semantics.
Let Kt be the formula 9w; (w = t _ w 6 = t), where w is the rst variable not appearing in term t. Under the reading above, Kt asserts that there is something which is known to be equal to or known to be di erent from t. Shortening this phrase a little bit, \Kt" is read as \t is known". Convergence statements are statements of the form, 8x 2 K; Kf(x) (that is, 8x; ((^iKx i ) Kf(x))).
For lack of a better word I call the system \synthetic", in respect of the synthetic (constructive, non-analytic) reading of \t = t". There already is such a thing as \epistemic" arithmetic; see Goodman 9] and Shapiro 20] To improve readability I insert a comma after quanti ers; and I use abbreviations such as \8x 2 K; " for \8x; (Kx )". In the (FO) axioms below,z is a list consisting of some or all of the free variables in the subsequent formula. In (KS) below,ã andb are terms with free variablesz.
The (FO) axioms are the axioms of classical rst-order predicate calculus without equality (adapted from 16]). The other axioms are modi cations of the usual axioms for equality.
These are meant to formalize, rst of all, the idea that x = y _x 6 = y is not valid; and second of all, that deductions involving = and 6 = can be understood as ones involving constructive 8x;y; (x = y :(x 6 = y)) (:E) 8x;y; (x 6 = y :(x = y)) (KR=) 8x; (Kx x = x) (S=) 8x;y; (x = y y = x) (:S=) 8x;y; (x 6 = y y 6 = x) (T=) 8x;y;z; ((x = y^y = z) x = z) (:T=) 8x;y;z; ((x = y^y 6 = z) x 6 = z) (KS) 
The only deduction rule of SFO(F) is (MP): , j . A very convenient feature of SFO(F) is that models of SFO(F) are just rst-order models in which the interpretations of`=' and`6 =', and the interpretation of the function symbols, satisfy the second group of axioms above. The system SFO(F) is complete for these models because SFO(F) is an extension of rst-order logic without equality (FO.1-6 above). Of course, models of SFO(F) may interpret`=' in a non-normal way i.e. x = y with x and y being di erent points in the model.
For the purposes of this work, it is appropriate to include extra copies of the function symbol for the initial function 0. Zero is special because it appears explicitly in the induction rule. Let F 2 consist of one function symbol for each PR 2 derivation, except that for the initial function 0 put countably many function symbols, f0 i : 0 i < !g into F 2 . (Throughout, ! is the rst limit ordinal.) One could use only a single symbol for zero if one were willing to accept that (ind) be restricted to induction over 0-free formulas; see the de nition of (ind) below.
A base system SQ 2 (synthetic Q in base 2) is de ned by adding the following axioms to SFO(F 2 ), for 0 i; j !. First are axioms for 0, s, p, and c: (rec.1) ((8ỹ 2 K; Kg(ỹ))^(8x;ỹ; z 2 K; Kh(x;ỹ; z)))
where f is de ned by recursion from h and g.
(rec.2) ((8ỹ 2 K; Kg(ỹ))^(8x;ỹ; z 2 K; Kh(x;ỹ; z))) (8x;ỹ 2 K; (x 6 = 0 j (Kf(px;ỹ) f(x;ỹ) = h(x;ỹ; f(px;ỹ))))) where f is de ned by recursion from h and g.
The understanding of (comp) is: if one knows what h(g 1 (x 1 ); : : : ; g m (x m )) is for all knowñ x, then one knows that f(x) = h(g 1 (x 1 ); : : :; g m (x m )) for all knownx. For (rec.1): if the base function, g, is known, and the step function, h, is known, then for all knownỹ, one knows that f(0;ỹ) is equal to g(ỹ). For (rec.2): if the base function g is known, and the step function h is known, then for all values x that are known to be di erent from 0, and for all knownỹ, if one knows f(px;ỹ) then one knows that f(x;ỹ) equals h(x;ỹ; f(px;ỹ)).
Note. In the recursion axiom (rec.1), the literal value 0 i is speci ed in the base term f(0 i ;ỹ). Since models may be non-normal, this formulation does not constrain f on all x such that x = 0 i . De nition: a shadow of zero is a point x in a model such that x = 0 i in the model, for some i. By (0.1) it doesn't matter which i one uses. On the syntactic side, the various function symbols 0 i , i 0 are variant names for 0. By (0.1), every variant name for 0 denotes a shadow of 0. A shadow of 0 may be denoted by more than one variant name, and there may be shadows of 0 that are not denoted by any variant name. The use of variant names for zero does not constitute an explicit reference to rami cation levels. The variant names of zero are interchangeable in the axioms. They are treated symmetrically rather than ordered into successive layers.
Finally one obtains SA 2 (synthetic arithmetic in base 2) by adding an induction rule to SQ 2 . In this rule, one requires as usual that x and z do not already appear in ; furthermore, it is required that 0 i does not already appear in . The (ind) rule is:
Other than the restriction concerning 0 i , x and z, the induction formula can be arbitrary; for example, it can contain any number of unbounded alternating quanti ers.
Note. Of considerable interest in the induction rule is the fact that the conclusion of induction says that z=y] holds at all z 2 K; in particular this includes all the shadows of zero. Thus, a use of induction constrains the truth value of at all shadows of 0, even { 9 { though in the premisses one is only required to have speci ed the truth value of at one of the shadows of zero, namely 0 i . Compare with (rec.1). It is only through occurrences of induction that the value of a recursively de ned function is constrained on all shadows of zero. This seems analogous to the situation in nonstandard model theory, where functions are only required to take on \correct" values at nonstandard numbers by the fact that induction must be satis ed. The restriction that 0 i does not already appear in , is mitigated by the fact that one can use other variant names 0 j (j 6 = i) in . In fact this was the purpose of introducing variant names for zero; the alternative would be to have only one symbol for 0, and not allow it into the induction formula y]. The variant names for zero are equivalent in the sense that they are all treated in the same way by the axioms. The point, then, is that the variant name 0 i used to form the base case of the induction has in some sense a kind of independence from all the other names in : there is no reason why 0 i has to denote identically the same element as 0 j , j 6 = i. In other words it is the axiom system (0.1, rec, etc), rather than just a coincidence of names, that determines the relationship between, on the one hand,`zero used as the base value for the induction variable' and, on the other hand,`zero used to refer to a xed element of the universe independent of the value of the induction variable'. This use of 0 i and 0 j contrasts with the ordinary unrami ed formulation in which such a distinction cannot be made.
Ranking Proofs
Now a rank, ( ), is assigned for each proof . But before de ning ( ), something should be said about fairness. One trivial way to have rank r provability correspond to rank r functions, would be to let the rank of a proof be the maximum of the ranks of the function symbols appearing in it. But this would be cheating, because then rank r proofs essentially could only use the de nitions of rank r functions. Obviously such a system could not prove the convergence statement for a function symbol outside of PR r 2 . One should exclude from consideration any de nition of ( ) which refers to (f), or in which ( ) is known to be large simply due the use of SQ 2 axioms for a lot of functions of high rank. To be fair, the use of an SQ 2 de ning axiom for a function should cost nothing in terms of the rank of the proof. This does not mean that the statement of the de nition of ( ) has to be independent of how and where composition and recursion axioms are used; only that uses of composition and recursion axioms should not increase ( ), either by themselves or in combination with (MP) and the logical axioms. In other words, every SQ 2 proof should have rank 0. Thus, induction must be critical to the de nition of rank.
A graph G( ), the constraint graph of , is used to de ne ( ). The constraint graph represents auxiliary information about the proof, namely certain constraints that must satisfy. Let V be the set of code numbers fx; y ; : : :g of variables in the language of FO, and let f0 i : i 0g be code numbers for the variant names of 0. The nodes of G( ) are V f0 i : i 0g. A`rank' will be assigned to each 0 i as well as to each x 2 V . I write hu; v ; di for an edge from u to v of weight d. 
(ind) ( 0 i =y]); (8x 2 K; (x 6 = 0 j ( px=y] x=y]))) j (8z 2 K; z=y]) (G.5) G( ) = G( 1 ) G( 2 ) fh0 i ; z ; 0ig fhx ; z ; 0ig This completes the de nition of G( ). Next I will de ne ( ; x ) for x 2 V . Approximately speaking, ( ; x ) is the supremum of the weights of all nite paths that end at x. In this way, one has ( ; x ) d + ( ; y ) whenever there is a nite path from y to x of total weight d. Thus, satis es the constraints expressed by the edges in G( ). In fact, it will be simplest to de ne to be the minimum function satisfying these constraints.
One hopes that a suitable renaming of variables in would guarantee that G( ) contains no positively weighted cycles. But instead of attempting such a renaming, I simply ignore any proofs whose constraint graph contains a positively weighted cycle. This is accomplished by assigning rank ! when a cycle occurs. Evidently, not too many proofs are ignored this way: later it will be shown that there are nite-rank proofs of convergence of all the primitive recursive functions.
A ranking function, q, is a total function from V f0 i : i 0g to N f!g, where N is the non-negative integers. Say that q is good for G, written q G, i : hu ; v ; di 2 G implies q( v ) d + q( u ). If q is good for G, then in fact q is good for every subgraph of G. For a nonempty set of ranking functions Q, the pointwise minimum`minQ' is the function q 0 such that q 0 ( u ) = minfq( u) : q 2 Qg, for all u 2 V f0 i : i 0g. It happens that if every q 2 Q is good for G, then so is minQ. By assigning q( u) = ! in case u is in a positively weighted cycle in G( ), one can guarantee that fq : q G( )g is nonempty. For details, The de nition of ( ) is \fair" in the sense discussed earlier, even though weighted edges are associated with the de ning axioms of the functions. Although it is true that a positively weighted edge is added for an instance of a function de nition (rec.1, G.3), such an edge ends at a name for zero rather than at a variable. The weight of this edge does not contribute to ( ) until a path containing the edge is extended by a (G.5) edge to reach the induction variable in an (ind) conclusion. This is because the de nition of ( ) only refers to q( x) for variables x 2 V , and an (ind) instance is the only place where an edge passes from some 0 i to some variable x 2 V . Uses of the axioms de ning the functions do not increase the rank either by themselves or in combination with (MP) and the logical axioms: all SQ 2 proofs have rank 0. Thus, induction is critical. Say that two occurrences of (ind) are nested if there is a path from any literal in the conclusion of one, to any literal in any antecedent of the other. If a proof has rank r < !, then it must contain instances of induction nested r deep: the graph G( ) contains a path passing through r di erent names for zero, corresponding to r interleavings of (G.3/rec.1) and (G.5/ind). 2 The converse is not true in general. In a rank 1 proof there may be arbitrarily many (ind) occurrences, and these may be arbitrarily deeply nested. This is analogous to the fact that a rank 1 function derivation may contain arbitrarily deeply \nested" recursions, for example if each recursion is on a di erent input. Not all occurrences of induction have new computational content. Viewed di erently, an occurrence of induction on a variable x might happen to generate a rami cation level that is less than the rami cation levels already generated by some other inductions in other parts of the proof. We wouldn't want to increase the overall proof rank for such an occurrence of induction. Essentially, the presence of weighted edges in some of the non-induction parts of the proof, is a way of determining 2 Consider a rank r proof, r < !. Its graph contains a path of weight r ending at a variable, in which each node of the path is labeled with a di erent element of V f0 i : i 0g. The graph doesn't contain any weighted cycles, because r < !. But the weighted edges in a graph are exactly the edges that pass from some variable x to some name for zero, 0 i (they are (G.3) edges). Consider any two weighted edges on the path, such that no weighted edge appears between them. In order to form a path, there must be a \return" subpath from the literal 0 i to the variable y that starts the next weighted edge. There also must be a similar \return" subpath from the last 0 j to the variable at the end of the path. These \return" subpaths must each start with a (G.5) edge corresponding to an instance of induction, because (G.5) is the only place where an edge is added from a zero to a variable. These r instances of (ind) are nested, and they are distinct because they use di erent names 0 i in their base cases.
whether or not subsequent inductions have new computational content i.e. generate a new rami cation level. An induction that does not use a new statement of fact (i.e. a de ning axiom for a function) is not one that needs to be accounted for.
In summary, although the de nition of proof rank uses the recursion axioms for the primitive recursive functions, proof rank is not a disguise for function rank. Proof rank relates to the layering of inductions. Function rank relates to the layering of recursions. These are two independent concepts. A low-rank proof can refer to high-rank functions, and a high-rank proof might refer only to low-rank functions.
The following lemma was promised above.
Lemma 4.1 For every proof , (1a) there is a ranking function q that is good for G( ), such that (1b) if x is a variable not in , then q( x) = 0. Furthermore, (2) if Q is any nonempty set of ranking functions such that every q 2 Q is good for G( ), then min Q is also good for G( ).
Proof. The required ranking function assigns the rst limit ordinal, !, when there is a cycle in G( ). (1). For u 2 V f0 i : i 0g, let P u be the set of nite-length paths terminating at u in G( ). Note P u is nonempty because it contains the trivial path terminating at u . Let W(p) be the sum of the edge weights in nite path p. De On the other hand, if q( v ) = !, then using the Fact, q( v ) = ! d + ! d + q( u ). The two cases together prove that if hu; v ; di 2 G then q( v ) d + q( u). Therefore (1a): q is good for G( ). Also (1b): if u does not appear in then P u contains only the trivial path of length 0 terminating at u , and therefore q( u) = 0.
(2) Assume that Q is non-empty and that every q 2 Q is good for G( ). Let q 0 = minQ and consider any edge hu ; v ; di 2 G( ). Let q be a function in Q minimizing q( v ); then q 0 ( v ) = q( v ) by the de nition of minQ. Since q is good for G( ), one has q( v ) d+q( u ). By the de nition of minQ again, q( u ) q 0 ( u ). Therefore, q 0 ( v ) = q( v ) d + q( u) d + q 0 ( u ). It follows that q 0 is good for G( ).
Standard Rami ed Model
Now the development turns to semantic issues. De ne a depth for each point in j N j f?g as follows: (x) = j for all x 2 N j , and (?) = ?1. The intuitive meaning is that (x) is the depth of knowledge that one has of x: the greater the depth, the greater one's understanding of x, and the more able one is to perform induction with x or to compute functions with x as an input. The multiple copies of an integer do not represent di erent values, but di erent amounts of understanding of a single integer value. Some more notation will be helpful. For a point x 2 j N j , let x be the corresponding integer (i.e. the integer without indication of which set N j it is in). For an integer n, let n] j be the copy of n in N j . For a function symbol f, one writes f for the interpretation of f in a given model, and f for the standard function on the integers de ned by the PR 2 derivation. Given an assignment A and a model M, one writes t for the interpretation of term t under Recall Kt 9w; (w = t _ w 6 = t); the interpretation K of K is j N j . The model does not satisfy 8x; Kx, because ? 6 2 K. Say that a function diverges on a given vector of points if the output of the function is not in K; otherwise it converges. In these models, functions converge i the input is adequate. For example, if any input is ? then the output is also ?. Given a ranking function q, say that M is good for q, written M q, i M is a variant standard rami ed model such that (0 i ) q( 0 i ) for all i. Note M 0 q for every ranking function q. When one considers all possible models M q for a given q, the interpretation of 0 i is essentially relativized to f 0] j : q( 0 i ) j !g. { 
{
None of the variant models is a model of the theorems of SA 2 . However, it will be shown that a suitable relativization of each SA 2 theorem is satis ed.
In order to relativize variables, let U j (1 j !) be new unary predicate letters. One should realize that the symbols U j are only being introduced in order to carry out the analysis, and they do not appear in the de nition of SA r 2 or in the nal statement of the results. Give U j the interpretation U j i j N i f?g in every variant model M. Thus, j k implies U j U k . As j increases, the subuniverses U j get smaller and smaller, and more and more functions are total on U j \ K; in some sense, more and more is known over U j \K. This seems to be similar in spirit to the successive worlds of an intuitionistic Kripke model.
For a formula , let q be obtained from by relativizing each variable x to U q( x ) . The relativization replaces each quanti er 8x; with 8x; (U q( x ) x ), and pre xes the formula with \U q( x ) x " for each free variable x.
The following closure property of U j is used for analyzing substitution (FO.5). Lemma 5.1 (Closure of U j ) Given a term t and any j 0, let A be an assignment for a variant M such that y 2 U j for all y 2 t and 0 i 2 U j for all 0 i 2 t. Then t 2 U j .
Proof. It is proved by induction on the term structure of t. If t is just a variable y, then the statement of the lemma follows trivially by the assumption y 2 U j . If t is a zero-ary function symbol f other than some 0 i , then (t) = ! and the statement again follows. If t is some 0 i then it follows trivially because 0 i 2 U j by assumption.
Otherwise, t is f(ã) and the arity of f is m f 1. By the induction hypothesis on each term inã, one hasã 2 U j , i.e. (a i ) = ?1 or (a i ) j (for 1 i m f ). Under the de nition of M 0 , ifã is inadequate for f then f(ã) is ?, in which case f(ã) 2 U j . On the other hand, ifã is adequate for f then (a i ) j for each i, because (a i ) < j ) (a i ) = ?1 )ã is inadequate for f. Therefore, ifã is adequate for f (with m f 1) one has (f(ã)) = minf (a i ) : 1 i m f g j, again implying f(ã) 2 U j .
Implicit Rami cation Theorem
Now we have arrived at the key \implicit rami cation" theorem relating the ranking of induction to the rami cation subuniverses U j . The theorem says that if proves and q G( ), then M j = q for every M q (including M 0 ). A simple semantic argument (see x7) will then show that if proves the convergence of f, then ( ) (f).
The proof of the implicit rami cation theorem is unfortunately long, since we must consider each axiom and rule of SA 2 . I have broken it into two lemmas. The rst lemma considers the simpler cases: all axioms other than (FO.5) and (rec.1). This lemma does involve some work, for (comp) and (rec.2). The second lemma handles the most interesting cases, nishing the theorem by treating the relativizations of (FO.5), (rec.1), (MP), and (ind). Since Kh(g 1 (x 1 ); : : : ; g m (x m ))) holds, it must be thatG is adequate for h, because h only converges on adequate inputs. It follows that x i 2x j ) (x i ) (h; j) for all i and j, because: if x i 2x j and (x i ) < (h; j) then (G j ) = (g j (x j )) = min(f (x i 0 ) :
) (x i ) < (h; j), contradicting thatG is adequate for h. The adequacy ofG also impliesG 2 K, which implies that for each j,x j is adequate for g j . Therefore, (x i ) (g j ; k) for all j and k such that x i (x j ) k . One also has (x i ) 0 for all i, because x i 2 K. Using the de nition of (f; i), these three statements about (x i ) imply that x i is adequate for f. Therefore, Finally, the relativized form of (rec.2) is:
((8ỹ 2 U q(ỹ ) \ K; Kg(ỹ))^(8x;ỹ; z 2 U q( x );q(ỹ );q( z ) \ K; Kh(x;ỹ; z))) 8x;ỹ 2 U q( x );q(ỹ ) \ K; (x 6 = 0 j (Kf(px;ỹ) f(x;ỹ) = h(x;ỹ; f(px;ỹ)))):
The argument is summarized as follows. The convergence statement Kf(px;ỹ) implies that hpx;ỹi is adequate for f. Since (x) = (px), this also means that hx;ỹi is adequate for f. It will follow using the de nition of that hx;ỹ;f(px;ỹ)i is adequate for h. As in the case of (comp), convergence of the two sides implies that the equality holds. The antecedent clauses actually are not required to show that (rec.2) q is satis ed. Letting A be any assignment, assume the antecedent of (rec.2) q is satis ed, and choose any x;ỹ 2 U q(x );q(ỹ ) \ K such that x 6 = 0 j . One must show that M; Aj x;ỹ j = Kf(px;ỹ). Then hpx;ỹi is adequate for f, because functions in M only converge on adequate inputs. Therefore (f(px;ỹ)) = min(f (px)g f (y i ) : 1 i < m f ? 1g) minf (f; i) : 1 i m f g (h; m f ) by the adequacy of hpx;ỹi and the de nition of (f). Also one has (x) = (px) (f; 1) (h; 1) and (y i ) (f; i+1) (h; i+1) for 1 i m f ?1, again using the adequacy of hpx;ỹi and the de nition of (f). It follows that hx;ỹ;f(px;ỹ)i is adequate for h. Easily, hx;ỹi is adequate for f because hpx;ỹi is adequate for f and because (x) = (px). In the variant model M, under the de nition of f for x 6 = 0 j with f derived in PR 2 by recursion from g and h, the adequacy of the inputs on each side of the equation implies that f(x;ỹ) = h(x;ỹ; f(px;ỹ)) holds. Now we have reached the more interesting cases, involving edges of G( ). satis es the relativized statement, assume M; A j = , letz 2 U q(z ) , and assume M; Aj~z z j = 8x 2 U q( x ) ; 0 . One must show that M; Aj~z z j = 0 t=x]. Because of the edge hx ; y ; 0i added in (G.2), one has q( x ) q( y ) for all variables y 2 t (it is trivial if y = x ). Similarly, the edge h x ; 0 i ; 0i ensures q( x) q( 0 i ) for all 0 i 2 t. Let j = q( x ); one has U j U q(y ) and U j U q( 0 i ) . Each variable y 2 t is either free or is amongz; in either case one has y 2 U j because (M; Aj~z z ) satis es a relativizing clause U q( y ) y that implies U j y. Similarly, each 0 i 2 t is interpreted by a shadow 0 i 2 U j because M q and U j U q( 0 i ) . Now the closure lemma for U j gives t 2 U j . Since M; Aj~z z j = 8x 2 U j ; 0 , one has M; Aj~z z j = 0 t=x] as required.
The relativized form of (rec.1) is:
The argument can be summarized as follows. The relativized antecedents assert that points at the depths given by q, are adequate for g and h. This, together with the (G.3) edges and the de nition of (f), ensures that appropriate vectors h0 i ;ỹi are adequate for f. Using the de nition of M 0 , the adequacy of inputs on both sides of the equality \f(0 i ;ỹ) = g(ỹ)"
ensures that the equality holds, because f is de ned in PR 2 by a recursion having g as the base function.
Assume the antecedent of (rec.1) q is satis ed, and choose anyỹ 2 U q(ỹ ) \ K; one must show M; Aj~ỹ y j = f(0 i ;ỹ) = g(ỹ). In M, functions only converge on adequate inputs; therefore, satisfaction of (8ỹ 2 U q(ỹ ) \ K; Kg(ỹ)) (under any assignment) implies that q( y j ) (g; j) for 1 j m g . Similarly, the satisfaction of (8x;ỹ; z 2 U q( x );q(ỹ );q( z ) \ K; Kh(x;ỹ; z))) implies that q( x) (h; 1), and q( y j ) (h; j + 1) for 1 j < m h ? 2, and q( z ) (h; m h ). Now, the edges added in (G.3) for the (rec.1) axiom are fhx; 0 i ; 0ig fhz ; 0 i ; 1ig fhz ; y j ; 0i : 1 j 2 m f ? 1g
Since q G( ), these give q( 0 i ) q( x) (h; 1) and, critically, q( 0 i ) 1 + q( z ) 1 + (h; m h ). Under the de nition of (f; 1) = maxf (h; 1); 1 + (h; m h )g it follows that q( 0 i ) (f; 1). We already have that q( y j ) maxf (g; j); (h; j + 1)g from the antecedents, and using the third set of edges one also has q( y j ) q( z ) (h; m h ), Since G( ) G ( 1 ) G ( 2 ), the assumption q G( ) gives q G( 1 ) and q G( 2 ). Therefore the induction hypothesis can be applied to 1 and 2 . Letting be the relativizing antecedents for the free variables of (other than y), and letting 0 be obtained from by relativizing the quanti ers only, the induction hypothesis implies that for all M 0 q, If f is one of the initial functions, then the convergence statement for f is proved using rst-order logic from the de ning axioms for f. For example, to prove convergence of c, one uses (p.4) together with (c.1-2). Other than (UI) and (UE), the only quanti er manipulation is of the form t 1 = t 2 Kt 1 or t 1 6 = t 2 Kt 1 . It follows that the only edges in the constraint graph are weight 0 edges originating at the quanti ed variable in an occurrence of Kt (for some term t).
If f is de ned by the composition h(g 1 (x 1 ); : : :; g m (x m )), then let 0 and 1 ; : : :; m be the proofs of convergence obtained by the induction hypothesis on h and g 1 ; : : :; g m .
Renaming the variables in 0 , say 0 is a proof of 8ỹ 2 K; Kh(ỹ). Eliminating each 8y j with g j (x j ), using (UE) on each 8x i in each j , j 1, and then making propositional moves followed by (UI), one obtains 8x 2 K; Kh(g 1 (x 1 ); : : : ; g m (x m )). In performing the replacement of y j with g j (x j ), one creates an edge of weight zero from y j to x i for each (rec.2) for f 8x;ỹ 2 K; (x 6 = 0 j (Kf(px;ỹ) f (x;ỹ) = h(x;ỹ; f (px;ỹ))) 8x;ỹ 2 K; x 6 = 0 j (Kf(px;ỹ) K f (x;ỹ)) 8x 2 K; (x 6 = 0 j (8ỹ 2 K; K f (px;ỹ) 8ỹ 2 K; K f (x;ỹ))) These two pieces are joined together by an (ind) instance, 8ỹ 2 K; K f (0 i ;ỹ) 8x 2 K; (x 6 = 0 j (8ỹ 2 K; K f (px;ỹ) 8ỹ 2 K; K f (x;ỹ))) 8u 2 K; 8ỹ 2 K; K f (u;ỹ) { 21 { Examining this outline, one sees that a path of weight one is created from the critical variable z to the induction variable u through the intermediary 0 i , due to the (ind) following the (rec.1). A path of weight zero is similarly created from the recursion variable x to 0 i and from there to the induction variable u . For the other variablesỹ, the instances of (rec.1) for f result in edges of weight 0 from z to y i , for 1 i m f ? 1. These are the only signi cant new paths created in the constraint graph. Although some paths are created due to the implicit use of f(x;ỹ) = h(x;ỹ; f(px;ỹ)) Kf(x;ỹ), these have weight 0 and terminate at the quanti ed variable in Kf(x;ỹ). That variable does not appear in h or g , hence these paths contribute zero to the rank of the overall proof.
By the induction hypothesis, ( h ; x ) = (h; 1) and ( h ; z ) = (h; m h ). Due to the new paths ending at u , and the fact that z and x do not appear in g , it follows that ( ; u) = maxf1 + ( h ; z ); ( h ; Altogether, the following has been proved. 
Ordinary Induction and Recursion
There is nothing special about the base 2 (induction-on-notation) formulation of the above results.
One can just as well de ne PR 1 instead of PR 2 , by replacing s 0 , s 1 , p, and c with the initial functions S(x) = x+1 and P(x) = x?1 and C(x; y; z) = \if x = 0 then y else z". The rule of \full recursion on notation" now becomes \full primitive recursion", replacing p with P. The de nition of (f) is carried over unchanged, except that the set of initial functions is di erent. It is shown in the companion paper 4] that for r 1, one has PR r 1 = E r+1 , the Grzegorczyk functions of level r + 1. By Ritchie's theorem, PR 1 1 consists of exactly the linear-space computable functions.
For a corresponding logic, one can de ne SQ 1 and SA 1 exactly as SQ 2 and SA 2 were de ned, but using a signature based on PR 1 , changing p to P in (ind) and (rec.1-2), and replacing the initial axioms for s 0 , s 1 , p, and c with new axioms corresponding to the initial functions of PR 1 . The results are carried over literally by reading p as P | except for the proof that M satis es the relativized axioms of the initial functions, which can be directly adapted to suit the new initial functions. 2 , a function is SA r 1 -provably convergent (using a PR 1 derivation) if and only if it is SA r 2 -provably convergent (using a PR 2 derivation).
Conclusion
The current work provides a contrast to earlier weak subsystems of arithmetic such as those of Buss 6] (for an overview see Krajicek 10] ). The system SA 1 2 is equivalent to Buss's S 1 2 in the sense that they both prove convergence of exactly the polytime computable functions. It seems quite remarkable that this de nition of polynomial time provability admits unrestricted quanti er complexity in the induction formula. The correspondence of PR i j and SA i j (j 2 f1;2g, 0 i < !) suggests that a very strong relationship holds between recursion and induction despite the presence of complicating logical elements such as implication and quanti cation.
It is interesting that rami cation levels, as identi ed in this work by the relativizations U j , can be inferred from the syntactic structure of a proof by induction. They do not need to be treated explicitly, either in the logical syntax via special unary predicate symbols or in the semantics via successive worlds with nested domains. Instead, they emerge naturally from an examination of the rami cation that seems to be implicit in ordinary induction. Although they are implicit rather than explicit, the rami cation levels U j seem quite analogous to the successive worlds that were presupposed by constructivists when inventing intuitionistic semantics.
Only symbols for the primitive recursive functions were included in SA 2 . If one were to admit general recursion or higher-type primitive recursion, then one could de ne e.g. a function with exponential output length, using only a single recursion on notation. Correspondingly, such a function could be proved convergent using a single induction (see Leivant 13 ] lemma 3.7). It would be interesting to see whether a polytime logic is obtained when one restricts Leivant's \intrinsic theory" over W 0 and W 1 by requiring that the recursive equations be primitive recursive, rather than by requiring only existential formulas in induction rules 13]. A distinction has been made between`zero' used as the base case of an induction and unrelated references to`zero' in the induction formula. It is not clear whether this distinction is fundamental or can be eliminated.
A drawback to the de nition of rank is that SA r 2 is not closed under modus ponens. This contrasts with the fact that PR r 2 is closed under composition. Although SA r 2 forms a proof \system" in a loose sense of the word, the approach has really been to view SA 2 as a powerful given system and then to measure the complexity of all SA 2 proofs. In practice, a feeling for the de nition of rank should allow one to write down proofs with con dence { 23 { that they will fall into a particular system such as SA 1 2 . An alternative viewpoint is that a system formalizing the idea of reasoning with limited resources shouldn't be closed under modus ponens 8].
Connections remain to be drawn between SA r 2 , SA r 1 , and earlier arithmetics. It should happen that the full systems SA 2 and SA 1 are both equivalent to Peano arithmetic, under a suitable translation of signatures and relativization to K. The issue is complicated by the presence of 0 i in the induction rule. Also, it would be nice to know more about SA ! 2 and SA ! 1 . A method of relabeling of variables in such that G( ) is guaranteed to be acyclic, would show that each SA ! 2 proof can be carried out in SA r 2 for some nite r. Finally, it would be interesting to carry out an analysis similar to the present one, but on a system having, like S 1 2 , only a nite number of prede ned function symbols. There seems to be a conceptual relationship between large non-standard integers and shadows of N ! at low depth. For a recursively de ned function f, the descending chain : : : ; f(n+2);f(n+1);f(n);::: is unfounded in a nonstandard model, where n is a nonstandard integer that corresponds to 0 in the natural way. In a rami ed model where n is a shadow of 0, the chain is also unfounded in the sense that f(n) is unconstrained by the axiom de ning f. In both cases, it is only induction that forces f to take on a`correct' value at points in these chains. Under this analogy, the subuniverses U 0 ; U 1 ; U 2 ; : : : are like smaller and smaller initial segments of a nonstandard model, with U ! being the standard integers. It would be quite interesting to nd an exact relationship between nonstandard integers in nonstandard unrami ed models, and shadow integers in standard rami ed models.
